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Introduction1
The more time that passes since the fall of the last military regimes in Latin America’s Southern
Cone, the more public expectation of moving beyond the transition period and toward democratic
consolidation grows. This consolidation can only begin to develop when social actors transform
themselves into “active partners” of democracy, as Mayoraga affirms.2 In the case of the Armed
Forces, this transformation presumes accepting a subordinate role to civilian governments and
recognizing democracy as the only possible political system. According to Narcís Serra, a specialist
on the subject, democratic consolidation begins after the elimination of military interference in
governmental and judicial tasks, a process typical of the transition phase. Civilian leaders then
assume the work of establishing a new defense policy, guaranteeing its implementation, and
directing all activities of the Armed Forces.3 In practice, however, this process is filled with
challenges, as it necessarily implies carrying out changes to profoundly established structures,
such as the institutional character of the Armed Forces, and its relationships with the civilian
government and the population. As a result, in many countries, some aspects of the transition phase
are prolonged, coinciding with important steps in the process toward democratic consolidation,
thus causing confusion and frustration within the society.
Twenty-five years after the end of the Chilean military dictatorship (1973-1990), the
redemocratization process still has not drawn to a close. Although strides have been made to
subordinate the Armed Forces to civilian governments and the needs of the current society, vestiges
of the dictatorship era and authoritarian enclaves still exist and impede democratic consolidation.
These tensions in civil-military relations have sparked the concern of national and international
human rights organizations and a large portion of Chilean society to such a degree that they have
even begun to occupy a space in the country’s cultural production. In recent years, various films
have been released that reflect upon how the military and the civil society affect one another,
particularly in relation to crucial subjects, such as the production of cruelty. Examples of these films
are: El soldado que no fue/The Soldier That Was Not4, El mocito/The Young Butler5, El tío/The Uncle6, and
La odisea de Ulises/Ulysses’s Odyssey.7
Although my forthcoming book will offer a comparative analysis of these works, in this article
I will focus on the film that has had both the biggest impact and generated the greatest response in
different formats and outlets, including academic articles, journalistic notes, blog entries, and radio
and television interviews with the directors and with the protagonist.8 The film, El mocito, tackles
1

Since this article was submitted, important developments occurred in the field of civil-military relations in Chile. These
are some of the most relevant events: in 2016, the parliament passed law 20.968, proposed by President Bachelet,
which defines torture as a crime and excludes civilians from military courts, both as plaintiffs and as defendants.
Also, in 2017, President Bachelet drafted a bill to compensate 27,952 prison survivors with a one-time payment of 3
million Chilean pesos (surviving spouses would receive 60% of the amount). Finally, in 2017, a new bill was drafted
to eliminate the Amnesty Law from the constitution, even though judges had stopped invoking it after 2006 when the
ICHR requested its repeal.

2

René Antonio Mayoraga,“Las perspectivas de consolidación de la democracia y los problemas delas relaciones
institucionales cívico-militares,” in La cuestión militar en cuestión. Democracia y Fuerzas Armadas, ed. Raúl Barrios Morón
and Rene Antonio Mayoraga (La Paz: Centro Boliviano de Estudios Interdisciplinarios, 1994), 55.

3

Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
28.

4

Leopoldo Gutiérrez, El soldado que no fue (Santiago de Chile: Polo Comunications, 2010).
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Marcela Said and Jean de Certeau, El mocito (Santiago de Chile: Icalmafilms, 2011), DVD.
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Mateo Iribarren, El Tío (Santiago de Chile: Monkey Puzzle Media, 2013), DVD.

7

Lorena Manríquez and Miguel Picker, La odisea de Ulises (Los Angeles: Andes Media LLC, 2014), DVD.
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In addition to the article by Eva Usi and the two articles by Michael Lazzara cited in this work, the film has been
addressed in many publications, including those by José Parra, Jorge Morales, Jara Villalobos, Camila Gutiérrez, Lucía
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Chile’s dictatorial past through the perspective of a civilian who was closely connected to the
Armed Forces. In contrast to earlier journalistic works about the dictatorship, which concentrated
on well-known official perpetrators and/or repressive actions,9this documentary focuses on an
ambiguous actor, and, by doing so, shines a light on grey areas of the regime and the civil society.
El mocito addresses the case of an individual living on the border between worlds often perceived
as mutually exclusive. He is a civilian, but he was also a member of the DINA—Chile’s secret
police under Pinochet— though not as a member of the Armed Forces, but rather in the role of
a butler. Although, as far as the public knows, he never participated in torture or assassinations,
through this position, he was aware of what was taking place, bore witness to events related to
state repression, and by fulfilling the tasks of his work, in many ways sustained the framework of
the authoritarian system.
By focusing on an atypical actor who is simultaneously an outsider and an insider in both the
Armed Forces and the civil society, the documentary presents a unique perspective on these two
groups and their intersections. In so doing, the film poses questions about responsibility for, and
complicity with, the cruelty that took place during the military regime and beyond that all members
of Chilean society must consider. How far can we extend responsibility for what happened? How
do we measure the guilt or innocence of those who did not commit or order the perpetration of
crimes, but were nevertheless part of the system that condoned such acts? Can victims exist within
the group typically thought of as victimizers? What forms does cruelty take in civil society in nonauthoritarian contexts? These queries imply a questioning of the military institution in its present
form and challenge both the concept of the citizen shaped within democracy and the possibilities
of nunca más/never again10 in Chile today. They are questions that the filmmakers leave unanswered
with the intent, perhaps, of allowing them to be explored in other realms, such as political and
educational spaces where they can be debated and may eventually generate potential solutions.
Before beginning to discuss the documentary, I will first offer a brief reflection on the latest
developments in Chile’s redemocratization process, which, as I propose, inform and drive the
type of documentary production with which films such as El mocito are associated. The theoretical
framework that will inform my analysis of the film is rooted primarily in the work of Zygmunt
Bauman (particularly his reflections on Milgram and Zimbardo’s experiments) and Hannah
Arendt, with important contributions from Daniel Feierstein on the sociology of genocide at the
regional level.
Civil-Military Relations in Chile: Significant Gains and Unsettled Accounts in the Redemocratization
Process
As civil-military relations expert Narcís Serra has noted, the redemocratization of a nation depends
upon the success of its leaders in transforming the Armed Forces, a highly autonomous and
politically powerful institution, into a state actor lacking powers of deliberation, one that faithfully
executes the government’s policies in order to ensure democracy.11 This process proves challenging
for both civil and military groups, given that they must adopt new roles and new forms of interacting
while avoiding direct conflict.12 As previously mentioned, in the twenty-five years that have passed
since the fall of the Chilean military regime, important gains have been made; however, unsettled
accounts and authoritarian enclaves, both of which are incompatible with democratic order, persist
Quaretti and Olga Larrazaba.
9

For example: Nancy Guzmán, Romo, confesiones de un torturador (Santiago: Editorial Planeta, 2000); Patricia Verdugo, Caso
Arellano: Los zarpazos del puma (Santiago: CESOC Ediciones, 1989); Pruebas a la vista: La caravana de la muerte (Santiago:
Sudamericana, 2000); Patricia Verdugo and Sebastian Brett, De la tortura no se habla: Agüero versus Meneses (Santiago:
Catalonia, 2004).

10 A motto used by relatives of disappeared prisoners and human rights activists to express the need for truth, justice,
and remembering in order to ensure that another coup d’état never occurs in Chile.
11

Serra, The Military Transition, 26.

12

For a detailed reflection on the long process of democratization in Chile, see Ana Ros, “Los otros con armas: Las
complejas relaciones cívico-militares en el Chile de postdictadura,” A Contracorriente. Revista de historia social y
literatura de América Latina, 14, no. 2 (2017), 17-42, https://acontracorriente.chass.ncsu.edu/index.php/acontracorriente/
article/view/1560.
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in Chile and have caused alarm among various international groups such as The United Nations
(UN), The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), and Amnesty International. I will
now discuss some of the most troubling examples. However, the significance of these gains and
unsettled accounts can only be fully grasped in relation to the challenges faced by the governments
that succeeded the military regime.
As Felipe Aguero13 affirms, in contrast to neighboring countries, where the end of the regime
was preceded by a gradual opening to democracy or by a negotiation between the army and
the opposition, the democratic transition in Chile followed the terms established in the 1980
Constitution, as proposed and approved by the military regime. Neither side, however, was
satisfied with the implementation of these terms, which was mainly determined by the results
of the 1988 plebiscite. While the regime had to accept that Pinochet could not rule the country
again until 1997, the opposition had to move forward with the democratic elections enabled by
the plebiscite, and in order to not place the redemocratization14 process at risk, they could not
attempt to negotiate the validity of the documents produced under the regime. As a result, the first
elected governments had to deal with a highly independent and influential Armed Forces built
on prerogatives that were derived directly from preexisting official documents: the 1978 Amnesty
Law, the 1980 Constitution, and the 1989 Organic Military Law.15
The Organic Military Law allowed the army to remain in control of its resources, which was
crucial for preserving autonomy from, and supremacy over, the civilian government. It established
that the army’s budget could never be lower than it was in 1989, and it validated the Reserved
Copper Law. According to this law, the Armed Forces received 10% of the yearly revenues obtained
by CODELCO, the state-owned copper exportation company, for maintenance and weapons
acquisition, with a minimum income of 180 millions dollars.16
Similarly, the 1980 Constitution granted the Armed Forces an active role in political life. It
designated former dictator Augusto Pinochet as Chief Commander of the Armed Forces until 1998,
thus eliminating the President’s ability to dismiss military leaders. It also created the COSENA,
or Counsel of National Security, an institution formed mainly by members of the Armed Forces
and the police that possessed veto power over the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches,
and was responsible for advising the President on subjects related to national security. Moreover,
this constitution established the incorporation of Pinochet to the Senate after the end of his term
as Commander, in Chief in 1998, and until the end of his life, thereby creating designated lifelong
senators. As a result of this arrangement, nine of the thirty-eight members of the Senate were not
elected democratically, but rather were nominated by the COSENA, the Supreme Court, and the
President.
The Amnesty Law extended the Armed Forces’ impunity by giving them the power to
pardon regular and political crimes that occurred between the 1973 coup and 1978, which
was the cruelest repressive period for all involved (perpetrators, accomplices, accessories to
crimes). Therefore, many tribunals, predominantly in agreement with the regime, have declared
themselves unable to judge human rights violations, thereby transferring the cases to military
courts.

13

Aguero, Felipe, “Treinta años después. La ciencia política y las relaciones Fuerzas Armadas, Estado y Sociedad,” Revista
de Cienca Política, 23, no. 2 (2003), 251-272.

14

This risk was mainly linked to conflicts generated by the possibility of prosecuting the human rights violations
and investigating the Pinochet family’s illicit gains. The constant tension between the army and civil politicians
materialized in two episodes that conveyed the threat of a new coup, respectively known as “el día del enlace” and
“el boinazo,” For more information on this subject, see Steve Stern, Reckoning with Pinochet (Durham & London: Duke
University Press, 2010).

15

David Álvarez Veloso, “Fuerzas Armadas en Chile: entre la configuración de nuevos roles y la normalización de las
relaciones cívico-militares,” Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales de América Latina y el Caribe, accessed May 6,
2016, http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/becas/2003/mili/alvarez.pdf.

16

Cristina Florina Matei and Marcos Robledo, “Democratic Civilan Control and Military Effectiveness in Chile,” in The
Routledge Handbook of Civic-Military Relations, ed. Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, (New York: Routledge,
2013), 284.
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Moreover, the post-dictatorship governments inherited systems that extended military control
and outlook in civic society. Under the regime, the police force, Carabineros, was part of the Defense
Cabinet, participated actively in the repressive system, and had their crimes judged by military
courts. Similarly, during the regime, the Mandatory Military Service became longer, harder to
elude, and more abusive than ever before.
Since the end of the dictatorship, most presidents have worked to gradually achieve truth
and justice, as well as to gain civilian control over the Armed Forces, especially once Pinochet,
as lifelong senator, was detained in London for his crimes against humanity. For instance, very
early on, Presidents Patricio Alwyn (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei-Tagle (1994-2000) rejected the
promotion of officers who had been accused of repressive actions and fraud; they also increased
presidential power over military appointments, dismissals and transfers. Moreover, Frei’s
Secretary of Justice, Soledad Avelar, implemented a reform in the Supreme Court that brought
an end to Pinochet’s hegemony. In the same vein, President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) limited
the COSENA’s power. Each of these elected leaders also worked to reveal the truth about human
rights abuses by the military in order to promote justice, as evidenced by the Rettig Report (1991),
the “table of dialogue” (1999), and the Valech Report (2004).
Additionally, many places of memory were created during this period, including the Museum
of Memory, which was inaugurated by President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010, 2014-2018) and has
become internationally renowned. President Bachelet continued her predecessor’s work to redefine
the role of the Armed Forces and make it a matter accessible to the community. She played a crucial
role in strengthening the civilian presence in the Department of Defense and in restructuring the
Department of Internal Affairs in order to make it more effective and include police institutions.
During her administration and that of President Sebastian Piñera (2010-1014), official institutes
and commissions were also created to handle and prevent human rights violations, including the
Department of Justice’s Human Rights Under-secretariat and the Parliament’s Commission of
Human Rights, Nationality, and Citizenship.
Despite this substantial progress toward a consolidated democracy, however, the Armed
Forces still maintain certain privileges that raise questions about their expected subordination to
civilian governments and their service to the democratic organization of civil society. For example,
the army continues to control its budget and secure its resources through the Restricted Law on
Copper. Likewise, the Amnesty Law of 1978 remains valid, despite the fact that forms of evading
its effects have been discovered (for example, by interpreting disappearances as permanent
kidnappings, the crime is legally still active and thus can be brought to trial). As for prosecutions,
although various agents of state repression are serving criminal sentences, the majority of those
convicted carry out these sentences in exclusive prisons, and the number of convicted agents is
much lower than those who walk free. According to official statistics released at the end of 2015, of
the 3,000 -5,000 perpetrators of violent crimes who worked in the DINA and the CNI — the Centro
Nacional de Informaciones, DINA’s new name after 1977— only 495 have been processed and only
163 are currently serving prison sentences.
The country’s dictatorial past continues to live on in other ways, including, for example, the
fact that the army still possesses the power to destroy records without prior approval from the
Executive Branch.17 Additionally, those who worked for the DINA/CNI can continue to offer their
services to the country’s military institutions. These military privileges sharply contrast with the
lack of reparation and specialized attention given to the many victims of human rights abuses,18 as
well as the continued prohibition of other individuals from returning to Chile after being forced
into exile during the dictatorship.19
17

“Privilegios para militares presos mantienen impunidad en Chile,” Sputnik News, April 8, 2015, accessed August 8, 2017,
http://mundo.sputniknews.com/opinion/20150804/1039956389.html.

18

Gonzalo Rodríguez Torres, “Los otros abuelos osos sobrevivientes de la dictadura pero olvidados e invisibilizados
en democracia,” Radio Villa Francia. Levantando la Voz, March 16, 2016, accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.
radiovillafrancia.cl/los-otros-abuelos-osos-sobrevivientes-de-la-dictadura-pero-olvidados-e-invisibilizados-endemocracia.

19

“Comité Contra la Tortura ONU regresó para revisar comrpomisos y avances,” Enlace Mapuche Internacional Noticias,
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With regard to defense, the advances that have been made still have not managed to fully
eradicate all authoritarian enclaves. Certainly, there have been achievements: the role of the
Armed Forces, for example, has been reoriented toward international affairs (including peace
missions and fighting against regional organized crime); the civil leadership in the Ministry of
Defense has been strengthened; and the country’s police institutions, such as the Carabineros
and the Investigative Police, have been subordinated to the newly restructured Ministry of the
Interior and Public Security. Despite these gains, however, there is still a strong tendency toward
militarization within the Chilean police force. Although the Carabineros are not a deliberative body,
they rely upon paramilitary organizational structures and militaristic disciplinary codes, and their
members have military training. Moreover, since its creation, the group has been linked to the use
of unchecked violent repression on the Chilean population. These actions continue to be endorsed
today through efforts such as the enforcement of Supreme Decree 1086, signed into law during
the dictatorship, which requires authorization in order to stage a public protest. The Carabineros’
actions are also bolstered by the new preventative identity control law, which authorizes them to
detain any individual, particularly in situations of protest, and request identification. Similarly,
until recently Carabinero’s crimes against civilians were treated as competence of military justice
and thus avoided adequate punishment under the law, which strengthened their repressive
tendencies.
A vestige of the dictatorship that has extended to the impunity of the Carabineros is the
continual harassment of the inhabitants of Mapuche and the Araucanía region, which is one of the
poorest areas in Chile. The state has justified the use of excessive amounts of repressive violence,
as a response to what were interpreted as terrorist acts committed by members of the community.
Confronted with acts of legitimate social protest, the government has applied Chile’s antiterrorist
law, which was enacted in 1984 when Pinochet’s regime was faced with a wave of protests and
select groups were endorsing armed actions.20
Following Contreras’ assertion, the militarization of Mapuche forces us to consider other
acts of protest that signal the neutralization of hotbeds of resistance, such as the government’s
management of youth, particularly those from low-income backgrounds, through compulsory
military service. Although the structure of Chile’s conscription program has undergone changes
in its recruitment techniques and organization, both of which have encouraged voluntary
participation, conscientious objection continues to be considered an insufficient excuse to exempt
young people from participating, and the conscription period continues to be governed by the
principles of obedience, hierarchy, and discipline that characterize the Armed Forces. As of 2015,
in addition to the over 10,000 youths that enrolled annually in the Military Service, and those
studying in the military academies, there were ten pre-military high schools in Chile, with a total
of 2,000 students.21
Finally, another extension of militarism in the post-dictatorship era is the inclusion of military
imaginaries within the formal education system.22 For example, courses in school often include
stories that emphasize the heroism of certain military figures, which participated in the construction
of the nation. Students also come to see military intervention as both normal and unquestionable.
For Contreras, this normalization is further promoted with
ceremonias en fechas memorables para el ejército, en donde los colegios detienen sus
clases para celebrar las efemérides, vistiéndolos con ropa militar, incentivando la creación
artística en torno a la fecha pero no generando instancias de reflexión que profundicen el
cuestionamiento del belicismo.
April 4, 2016, accessed August 8, 2017, https://www.mapuche-nation.org/espanol/html/noticias/ntcs-562.html.
20

Paula Molina, “Los problemas de Chile y su ley antiterrorista,” BBC News, August 1, 2014, accessed August 8, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias 2014/08/140801_chile_ley_antiterrorista_nc.

21

“Colegios premilitares en Chile: El rigor de la disciplina,” 24Horas.cl, accessed December 21, 2017, http://www.24horas.
cl/nacional/colegios-premilitares-en-chile-el-rigor-de-la-disciplina-1671628.

22

Dan Contreras, “La violencia, el servicio military y el sistema educativo en Chile,” War Resisters International, May 17,
2014, accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.wri-irg.org/en/node/23364.
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[“ceremonies on memorable days for the army, in which schools cancel classes to celebrate
these holidays, dressing the children in military clothing, incentivizing artistic creation
related to the celebration, but never allowing space for reflective moments in which students
can consider and question the day’s militarism.23]

Likewise, Chile has maintained certain practices during the school day that were born in
military barracks and have come to be normalized among the civilian population: pseudo-military
brigades that help to maintain order on the playground, bands that perform military music,
uniforms, and protocols of order that are very similar to those used in military schools.24
El Mocito: The Blurred Line Between Civilians and the Military in the Production of Cruelty
As mentioned before, of all the documentaries that tackle civil-military relations in Chile, El mocito,
directed by Marcela Said and Jean de Certeau, has had the greatest impact across an array of
disciplines, including journalism and academia, ultimately becoming what Michael Lazzara25 has
called a “phenomenon.”26 The “mocito phenomenon” can be attributed to the centrality of the
film’s protagonist, Jorgelino Vergara, in the lawsuits associated with the crimes against humanity
committed during the dictatorship. In 2007, after years of living in relative isolation, Vergara was
located and called to testify about his involvement in the DINA during the 1970s. Eager to prove his
innocence in the face of murder accusations, Vergara offered a detailed account of his knowledge
of those years of maximum repressive violence, revealing “uno de los secretos mejor guardados
de la dictadura” [“one of the best kept secrets of the dictatorship”].27 His narrative of the events
helped to confirm the existence of the Simón Bolívar extermination center and the Lautaro Brigade,
a group of DINA agents who operated in the center. In his testimony, Vergara identified more than
seventy ex-agents who had never before been associated with acts of state-sponsored terrorism,
a move that led to the largest prosecution of human rights violations in the country’s history.
Vergara’s detailed memories helped to illuminate some of the most inhumane forms of repression
employed during the regime and reveal the circumstances surrounding the deaths of many of the
desaparecidos.
However, Vergara remained a privileged actor at his detention and was exempted from the
accusations that brought him before the court and drove him to testify in the first place. According
to his own words and those of other suspects, Vergara never participated directly in kidnappings,
torture sessions, or assassinations during his time at Simón Bolívar, but rather provided assistance
in his role as butler when he was just an adolescent. It is there, perhaps, that we can derive the
meaning of the word “mocito” (“youngster” or “young butler”) that appears in the documentary’s
title: an indication of both Vergara’s youth and occupation. When he was seventeen years old, and
after having worked as a servant for a military family, for two years, Vergara received fast training
and joined the DINA. However, he belonged to the lowest levels of the organization: serving
23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

25

Michael Lazzara, “El fenómeno Mocito (Las puestas en escena de un sujeto cómplice)”, A Contracorriente. Una revista de
historia social y literatura de América Latina, 12, no. 1 (2014), 21, accessed August 8, 2017, https://acontracorriente.chass.
ncsu.edu/index.php/acontracorriente/article/view/1301.

26

In a more recent article, “Complicity and Responsibility in the Aftermath of the Pinochet Regime: The Case of El
Mocito,” Lazzara offers additional information about the use of the documentary in educational settings. His work
suggests that the films themselves are not mere vehicles of collective memory, but rather that the memory project
arises as a result of what is done with these works. In other words, the interpretation and the use of that interpretation
in both educational and political settings is what gives shape to the memory of Chile’s dictatorial past while also
delineating the needs of the present.

27

Javier Rebolledo, author of A la sombra de los cuervos: los cómplices civiles de la dictadura (Santiago: Ceibo Ediciones, 2012),
worked as a researcher and assistant director on Said and de Certeau’s documentary. After five years of conducting
research and thirty hours of interviewing Vergara for the film, Rebolledo embarked on his own project entitled
La danza de los cuervos/The Dance of the Ravens (Santiago: Editorial Planeta, 2016), a detailed piece of investigative
journalism that delves into Vergara’s life as a mocito, his participation in the DINA, and his destiny upon being
discharged from Simón Bolívar in 1985. Rebolledo’s study was praised by critics and was the best-selling non-fiction
book in Chile for five consecutive weeks.
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coffee to the main agents during torture sessions, delivering food to the prisoners, watching over
them during their trips to the bathroom, standing guard and cleaning away any evidence of the
exterminations taking place at the center, and even transporting bodies to the trunks of cars that
would disappear the victims for good. This ambivalent position of the protagonist with respect
to the crimes committed by the DINA raises a crucial dilemma regarding his possible guilt or
innocence. The same quandary is presented at the beginning of the documentary when, in a modest
house in Ñuñoa, looking at the camera, Vergara states:
Yo soy el hombre más honesto que ha pisado la tierra. Aunque tú no lo creas. Aunque fui
partícipe de asesinatos, secuestros y todo el atado… Oye, yo lo vi, pero nada más... O sea,
yo no participé. O sea, tu no podrías acusarme a mí de asesino… ¿Si o no? Porque de hecho,
en los hechos, yo no fui asesino. Pero sí te digo una cosa: asesinaron, mataron tanta gente,
comadre.... Mira, mira… ¡Sin escrúpulos las mataron! Pa’que te digo más: las mataron tan sin
escrúpulos que a mí me dolía siendo un adolescente, pues. Ese es mi cuento.
[I am the most honest man who has walked this Earth. Even though you don’t believe me.
Even though I participated in assassinations, kidnappings, and all of that… Listen, I saw it,
but nothing more… I mean, I didn’t participate. Or rather, you wouldn’t be able to accuse
me of being a murderer… Yes or no? Because in fact, if you look at the facts, I wasn’t a
murderer. But I will tell you something: they assassinated, killed so many people, man…
Look, look… They killed them without shame! And I’ll tell ya something else: they killed
them so shamelessly that it hurt me as a teenager, ya know? That’s my story.]28

In this declaration, Vergara elucidates the complex question of guilt and responsibility in
situations of violent repression, assigning blame to the author of the crime: a murderer is someone
who commits a murder. This distinction functions well in Vergara’s case, given that he declared
himself innocent in the accusations of homicide brought against him and that motivated his
detention. This, however, is not a conclusive reflection. On the contrary, it forces us to consider
what, then, would be the charge and the corresponding verdict brought against Vergara or any
other individual who held a similar role in the detention centers. Accomplice? Collaborator?
Accessory to the crimes? The consideration of a possible response poses new questions in the
specific case of the protagonist: How would the accusations brought against Vergara and his
subsequent punishment be impacted by the fact that Vergara was underage and worked for the
military during a dictatorship when his possible crimes were committed?
Vergara delves into these questions himself in a later sequence of the film, in which he consults
a renowned human rights lawyer, Nelson Caucoto, about the possibility of receiving governmental
compensation for the emotional injuries he suffered while working at the Simón Bolívar detention
center. Vergara feels that he deserves to be compensated for having been an “involuntary actor” in
the crimes that occurred at Simón Bolívar and for the oppressive character of his experience, which
damaged his personal development at an age that typically defines one’s place in society:
Fui utilizado, en el fondo, porque cuando ya vieron que ya prácticamente no servía… De
hecho me prohibieron estudiar, no me dejaron terminar la enseñanza básica ni nada. Me
las tuve que jugar muy duramente para poder terminar mis estudios. Me aplicaron muchas
prohibiciones, por decirlo así, entonces, me sentía en el fondo, prácticamente, como un preso
más.
[I was basically used because when they already saw that I was practically of no use … In fact,
they prohibited me from studying; they didn’t let me finish even a basic level of education or
anything. I had to work really hard in order to be able to finish my studies. They placed a lot
of restrictions on me, so to speak, so I felt practically like another prisoner.]29
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In lieu of lending clarity to the issues surrounding the accusations against Vergara and
an appropriate sentencing, this passage only poses more questions: Can victims exist among
victimizers? Innocents among the guilty? And, perhaps most crucially, can the guilty be among
those who are generally understood to be innocent? As we will see, the documentary suggests
that between the unquestionable poles of victim and victimizer, innocent and guilty, there is an
ample spectrum of various grades, shades, and even overlaps, all of which transcend a more binary
division of civilians and military. This complexity belies a more profound one that is at the very
core of the Armed Forces’ existence in society — a group of citizens who possess a legitimate
monopoly on arms, centralized violence, and missions that might affect the civilian population.
The filmmakers approach this complexity, and we do as well, through the final question that
Caucoto asks Vergara during their meeting: “¿Cómo es que pudo soportar tanto siendo un joven?”
[“How did you manage to bear so much as a teenager?”]30 In other words, how is it possible that a
“normal” adolescent, without any apparent disorders or disruptions that might prevent him from
functioning in society, became an accomplice to crimes so abhorrent that, years later, they continue
to torment him and bring shame to his family? Intent on understanding this process, Said and de
Certeau seek to uncover the man behind the mocito of the DINA, and through an exploration of his
distinct characteristics, comprehend the circumstances that led him to the army, the conditions that
possibly propelled him to remain in the middle of the inferno — and even after that to continue
working for the CNI after he came of age — and the consequences that all of these events had upon
the rest of his life.
Throughout the documentary, the filmmakers show Vergara as a man transformed by his
experience in the DINA, but also as someone who maintains lingering attributes that connect
him to the rest of the population, to those who did not take part in the army’s violent crimes.
Throughout the film, we see many facets of Vergara: a aggressive man who is attracted to weapons;
an affectionate father who worries about his daughter; a believer who seeks relief through religious
ceremonies; a solitary man, even in public spaces or at community events; a disturbed man who
is willing to collaborate with the human rights cause; a hard, tough man; and a survivor. This
comprehensive look at Vergara and the aspects of his personality that paint him as a “common”
man are, however, potentially controversial.
Speaking to this point, in the section of his article titled “La humanización del cómplice”/“The
Accomplice’s Humanization,” Lazzara notes,
Cuando se intenta generar un punto de identificación entre Vergara y el espectador,
presentándolo como un hombre común, se corre el riesgo de diluir responsabilidades. Los
relatos naturalistas y deterministas no nos sirven para analizar casos como éste.”
[“When trying to create a point of identification between Vergara and the viewer by
presenting him as a common man, you run the risk of diluting responsibilities. Naturalistic
and deterministic accounts do not help us analyze cases like this one.]31

In this analysis, I maintain, on the contrary, that Vergara’s responsibility is firmly established
through his memories of the exterminations that occurred at Simón Bolívar, which are both an
indelible mark of his participation and a central part of the documentary. His humanization,
therefore, forces us to reflect upon the circumstances and the social structures that push a “common
man” to become involved in the extermination and mortification of so many others. Dictatorial
proceedings of the magnitude seen in Chile do not come to fruition solely at the hands of repressive
ideologues and the state’s principal executioners, but also require the participation of many
“common” men and women in distinct roles with varying degrees of responsibility. Considering
Vergara to be an exceptional man (mentally disturbed, a monster), and thus capable of having been
an accomplice to the state’s violent acts of repression, provides an easy answer to the question of
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how such horror was possible. This simple solution, however, is not satisfactory because it impedes
productive reflection upon the final attainment of nunca más on both the individual and collective
levels.
The documentary provides examples that offer a glimpse into the structures that allowed such
horrors to take place. The protagonist’s initial words situate him as a witness in relation to the
crimes: “I saw them, but nothing else.”32 This — combined with the empathy that Vergara later
affirms having felt in the face of the victims’ suffering and the fact that, despite these feelings, he
continued to work at the extermination center — may indicate a transformation that, according
to Ervin Stub, witnesses often suffer: “Bystanders also learn and change as a result of their own
action — or inaction. Passivity in the face of others’ suffering makes it difficult to remain in internal
opposition to the perpetrators and to feel empathy for the victims.”33 However, Vergara’s case is
not that of a simple witness. In the following quote, for example, he clearly contradicts himself
regarding his status solely as a witness, thus undermining the veracity of that classification:
“Even though I participated in assassinations, kidnappings, and all of that […] I didn’t participate.”34
His initial form of participation, ambiguous in its peripheral nature to the crimes, echoes the
discoveries made by Milgram in his experiments exploring situations that enabled common people
to exhibit cruel behavior. One of the elements presented in these situations is what Bauman refers
to as floating responsibility:35 an organizational structure in which every member transfers his
individual responsibility to his superior, who can then transfer it to something intangible yet central
to the group, such as its mission and doctrine. Vergara makes it clear that he was not ultimately
responsible for the crimes: “in fact, if you look at the facts, I wasn’t a murderer.”36 Although his
work allowed his superiors to carry out murder and torture, he did not give the orders nor did
heexecute the crimes, thereby permitting him to avoid blame.
Another element akin to the repudiation of responsibility is the distance between the repressive
actions carried out and the abhorrent final result. As Bauman observes about the conclusions made
by Milgram, “it is psychologically easy to ignore responsibility when one is only an intermediate
link in a chain of evil action but is far from the final consequences of the action.”37 We can clearly
see this distancing manifested in Vergara’s case, given that his seemingly neutral work of cleaning,
cooking, and watching over the prisoners actually facilitated the extermination center’s day-today functioning. Knowing this allows us to extend our understanding of the focus of Said and de
Certeau’s documentary: the current system at work in today’s post-dictatorship era is marked by
a clear disconnect—one largely rooted in processes of compartmentalization, misinformation, and
rationalization—between individual actions both in and outside of the workplace and the criminal
repercussions of these actions in the lives of others.
Like the division of tasks performed by the gears of a machine or the many clues leading
to a crime, routine and habit often transform one’s work and its moral implications into an
unquestionable—and unquestioned—act.38 As the documentary reveals, while Vergara’s job at the
extermination center began with relatively routine tasks, his level of involvement in the crimes
steadily increased, ultimately leading to contact with the evidence itself — the bodies of the victims—
and his later work for the CNI. The steady escalation of Vergara’s participation at Simón Bolívar
parallels the mechanism of “sequentiality” that Bauman observes in Milgram’s experiments, which
he suggests is one of the factors that forces individuals into potential situations of collaboration.
When an actor experiences a gradual increase in his involvement in tasks that enable a criminal
act to take place, he is unable to stop or abandon the process without first evaluating what has
already occurred: if the next step in the chain of tasks can be judged as morally questionable, it
32
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is therefore possible that the prior task was also morally questionable in some way. “Smooth and
imperceptible passages between the steps lure the actor into a trap; the trap is the impossibility
of quitting without revising and rejecting the evaluation of one’s own deeds as right or at least
innocent.”39 Furthermore, as an actor advances within the chain of command, he encounters
increasing obstacles that limit his ability to stop participating in the crimes or distance himself
from his tasks. This sensation of imprisonment appears in the film during Vergara’s conversation
with Caucoto, when he affirms that, while working at the extermination center, he felt “practically
like another prisoner.” Although the protagonist attributes this sensation to the restrictions that
were placed upon him, his explanation begins with a different idea, one connected with the theme
of gradualness (“I was basically used because when they already saw that I was practically of no
use…”).40 He abruptly interrupts this thought, however, perhaps precisely to allow for a moment
of self-critique. With a tone of resentment, he suggests that, in contrast to what he expected, and
what was likely due to his level of involvement, his superiors disposed of him when his skills no
longer suited their needs.
The restrictions that Vergara mentions in his conversation with Caucoto effectively severed his
relationship with the world beyond the extermination center, creating an atmosphere that allowed
only minimal opportunities for independent thought: he lived at the center and was not allowed
to attend classes or to continue with his studies. Accordingly, the military limited his ability to
question the events he observed or experience a moral dilemma as a result of his collaboration. As
Bauman affirms, “the readiness to act against one’s own better judgment, and against the voice of
one’s conscience, is not just the function of authoritative command, but the result of exposure to
a single-minded, unequivocal and monopolistic source of authority.41 This introduces a relevant
reflection on the audience’s present, regarding the value of authentic pluralism in society as a
tool that encourages the use of critical judgment and helps curve the impulse to commit morally
questionable acts.
In her essay “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” Hannah Arendt enriches this
reflection by suggesting that many average people who have collaborated in some way with
oppressive regimes have not done so out of support for the regime’s goals, but rather because
they understand that the only way in which they can participate in society — and thus the
regime — is through a demonstrated respect for the laws and norms that sustain it: they
automatically substitute one value system for another, an old order for a new one.42 According to
Arendt, this conduct directly opposes the act of thinking, that is, of questioning the dominant order:
an act that stems from the need to live in peace with one’s self and always provokes resistance.43
The rise of independent thought in sociopolitical systems (authoritarian or democratic) that in
reality aspire to suppress thought—to encourage obedience and civilian support—is difficult to
explain. For Arendt, “[t]he dividing line between those who want to think and therefore have to
judge by themselves, and those who do not, strikes across all social and cultural or educational
differences.”44 It could also be argued, however, that the reasons behind a lack of thought—or a
lack of desire to engage in thought— change according to one’s socioeconomic standing.
The documentary explores this possibility through an examination of social class. In one
particular scene, Vergara gets together with his brother, Francisco Vergara, so that he can tell
the protagonist’s story from the perspective of a family member. His appearance and manner of
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speaking indicate both his rural, working class background and his lack of education, and his
version of events highlights Vergara’s roots in the same reality. Francisco justifies his brother’s
work in the DINA with his precarious economic situation, the ease with which he obtained the
job, the indoctrination he suffered, and the transformation that he underwent as a result of his
experience at the center.
Fue fácil para ellos ingresar a trabajar en el cuento ese que era la DINA. Los preparaban un
poco nomás y vamos trabajando. Yo mismo si hubiera ido a Santiago capaz que me hubieran
metido y hubiera terminado trabajando en la DINA o en la CNI. Pero no, no lo habría hecho.
Jorgelino lo hizo más por necesidad, porque él se fue solo a Santiago. Y en la familia se toca
muy poco el tema ese porque es como una vergüenza, ¿me entiende? […] Porque a él lo
prepararon para trabajar, como quien dice le hicieron un lavado de celebro (sic). Y después
que salió de la DINA ya Jorgelino no es el mismo.
[It was easy for them to get a job in the business that was the DINA. They prepared them just
a little bit, nothing more, and then they started working. If I had gone to Santiago it’s possible
that I would’ve gotten involved and ended up working for the DINA or the CNI. But no, I
would’ve have done it. Jorgelino did it more than anything out of necessity, because he went
to Santiago alone. And in our family we don’t talk about this a lot because it’s sort of an
embarrassment, you know? […] Because they prepared him to work, and as you might say,
they brainwashed him. And after he left the DINA, Jorgelino wasn’t the same anymore.]45

The hint of agency that Francisco Vergara appears to introduce with respect to his brother’s actions
by noting, “I wouldn’t have done it,” disappears in the face of Vergara’s need to survive and the
vulnerability he felt being far from his family at such an early age.46 Vergara’s transformation as a
result of his interactions at the extermination center—his exposure to a self-legitimized monolithic
authority, his superiors’ normalization of cruelty, and his rapid integration into the group—further
substantiates and explains his actions.
This apparent dilution of the protagonist’s agency preoccupies Lazzara, who sees Vergara
as someone who, although damaged, tried to benefit materially from Chile’s repressive system.47
Although this may be true, to generate a broader understanding in this article, it is necessary to
consider the social structures and conditions that drive an individual to feel, think, and act in
such a manner. In his article, Lazzara suggests that subjects like Vergara, who lack power, culture,
or familial support, are produced by certain economic and political structures and exploited by
repressive systems.48 While I agree with this assertion, I am interested in digging deeper into
the relationships that it establishes, given that the “certain economic and political structures”
to which Lazzara refers pertain to periods of democracy. If during authoritarian regimes these
formerly marginalized subjects are exploited by the repressive system, we must first look at the
democratic society in which these subjects emerge, as well as the prevailing economic systems
and their relationship to the army. If, as a result of its oppressive characteristics, the Chilean
economic system continues to produce “mocitos,” and the army continues to be a hierarchical
and authoritarian institution with the space to impose its logic upon the population and attract
the poorest members of society, then it is probable that, when faced with a new military coup, this
type of individual would collaborate once again. Accordingly, this establishes a line of continuity
between the dictatorship and democracy that requires our attention.
With respect to the relationship between the civilian government and the army, Marcela Said’s
first documentary, I Love Pinochet49, released in 2001, was revelatory. In an effort to depict the
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phenomenon of pinochetismo, Said interviews families and individuals from distinct social classes
and also visits the military academy. During the visit to the military academy, Said observes
moments in class in which, under the guise of religion, the instructor openly defends the military
dictatorship, degrades the democratic system as a producer of misery, exalts obedience as a
synonym for total liberty, and praises military commitment that involves sacrifice for the homeland.
Ten years later, as the documentary El soldado que no fue50 shows, the officials who were interviewed
continue to proudly defend the vision of the army as the savior of society and a guarantor of order.
Other episodes in El mocito that occur both before and after the encounter with Vergara’s
brother add new insight into the socioeconomic dimension of the protagonist’s actions. For
example, we learn through the testimonies of the residents who live in the humble region of Chile
where Vergara settled after leaving the army that, upon his arrival, he pretended to have a military
command post and behaved in the same abusive manner as his superiors at the center: “pintando
el mono de que, puta, él si quería hacía la cagada aquí en la población, que hacía lo que él quería
y a que a él, puta, nadie le podía parar el avión, y que él no era cualquiera” [“he was making such
a fool of himself, pretending that he could fuck shit up here in town if he wanted, that he could
do whatever he wanted, and that nobody could clip his wings, and that he wasn’t just anybody.”]51
Vergara’s aspiration to be not just “anybody” emphasizes that his affiliation with the army gave him
a sense of inclusion, validation, and status that is difficult to achieve in Chilean society, particularly
for someone from a marginalized background. His impulse to use this affiliation and feign a higher
status within the military corresponds to a need to separate himself from the poor population into
which he saw himself forced to return.
The following quote confirms that the military’s greatest source of superiority comes from the
fear experienced by the civilian population after a prolonged period of unrestricted and unpunished
power: “los policías en aquella época eran pesados, los policías de aquella época eran muy mala
clase, pegaban y después decían por qué” [“the police back then were unpopular, the police at
that time had a bad reputation, they would beat people first and then explain why.”]52 Before the
dictatorship, the prestige of the Armed Forces was related both to its legitimate role as a political
actor, as well as its composition, which was historically dominated by the middle class and the
provincial upper class.53 By the 1960s, confronted with dwindling numbers, the army began to
recruit members of the lower class, thereby minimizing the importance of socioeconomic standing;
since then, however, there has been a clear resurgence of class-consciousness within the military
and its institutions. In 2012, for example, the army issued an internal directive in which, as a security
means, it recommended that the selection commission exclude “aquellos que presenten problemas
de salud física, mental, socioeconómica, delictuales, consumidores de drogas, homosexuales,
objetores de conciencia y testigos de Jehová” [“those who present problems with their physical
and mental health, socioeconomic standing, delinquents, drug addicts, homosexuals, conscientious
objectors, and Jehovah’s Witnesses”] in order to recruit “ciudadanos más idóneos moral e
intelectualmente capacitados” [“the most morally fit and intellectually capable individuals.”]54
The centrality of Vergara’s affiliation with the military in the construction of his identity
continues to develop during his encounter with the head of the Lautaro Brigade, Juan Morales
Salgado, who was brought to justice as a result of Vergara’s testimony. During their conversation,
Vergara notes: “Yo conozco muchas facetas de su persona Sr. Morales y lo respeto mucho […]
Fueron como mis padres en esa brigada y como madres también, las mujeres me querían mucho”
[“I know many facets of your personality, Mr. Morales, and I respect you a lot […] They were like
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my fathers in that brigade and like mothers too, the women cared for me a lot.”]55 In this quote,
the sense of validation that Vergara previously noted gains an affective dimension. This sense
of affection, generated by his contact with the other members of the brigade, does not appear to
conflict with the pain that Vergara felt upon witnessing their acts of repression (“they killed them
so shamelessly that it hurt me as a teenager”) or even his own oppression at their hands (“I felt
like I was practically like another prisoner.”)56 This contradiction allows us to consider different
explanations or interpretations.
On one hand, the importance of belonging becomes a reaffirming factor in situations of
internal conflict. As Bauman observes, a victim’s physical isolation necessarily implies a certain
proximity to his victimizers: “Physical closeness and continuous co-operation tends to result in
a group feeling, complete with the mutual obligations and solidarity it normally brings about.”57
We can observe this process in the film when Vergara mentions Morales’ “many facets” and the
parental roles fulfilled by his companions. In such cases, the intimacy fostered by the group setting
allows new aspects of a person’s character to emerge that extend beyond his role at work, thus
further strengthening group members’ bonds. Moreover, the fact that the perpetrator belongs to
a group greatly facilitates his ability to enact violence, which, accordingly, begins to take on a
collective character.58
On the other hand, it is possible that the profound contradictions expressed by Vergara are
evidence of a survival mechanism, one that allowed him to adapt to a hostile environment and
protect himself from being either physically or psychologically abused. As the film progresses,
Vergara adds the term “survivor” to his initial description of himself as “a prisoner almost.”59 In
one particular scene, a drunk Vergara reaffirms his willingness to contribute to the human rights
cause despite the consequences that it may bring, noting:
Yo se sobrevivir. Porque ese conocimiento me lo dieron quienes tenían que dármelo y lo
he recopilado y sé sobrevivir y eso en el fondo me da fortaleza […] ¿Tú crees que alguna
vez en la vida yo me he quebrado por eso? Jamás. No me quiebro. ¿Sabes porque no me he
quebrado? Porque me enseñaron, en la vida, a no quebrarme: a ser fuerte, a ser perro.
[I know how to survive. Because I got that knowledge from people who had to give it to me
and I’ve gathered it up and now I know how to survive and that gives me strength deep
down […] You think that at any point in my life I’ve broken because of that? Never. I don’t
break. Do you know why I haven’t broken? Because they taught me, in life, how to not break:
to be strong, to be fearless.]60

In this passage, the protagonist refers to a learning process that provided him with a specific
knowledge, but fails to mention the lessons involved in it, perhaps because of their traumatic
nature. If he indeed learned to survive and not break, it is because he experienced circumstances
that he perceived as a threat to his physical and emotional integrity. In this context, an affective
identification with his perpetrators could be the expression of a compromise that allowed his
tormented psyche to continue functioning.61
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The notion of “adaptation,” explored by Argentine sociologist and genocide expert Daniel
Feierstein, contributes to our understanding of this phenomenon. As one of the principal goals
of the concentration camp system, adaptation is a survival mechanism in which the victim, in the
face of a total annihilation of his or her subjectivity after being tortured, comes to either partially
or fully identify with the values of his or her perpetrators.62 While prisoners held at detention
centers are the principal target of adaptation, its effects transcend prison walls and ultimately
impact society at large — albeit in a diluted form — through an authoritarian sociopolitical
climate, the testimonies of survivors, and the unknown knowledge of what happened, despite
the visible marks of repression in the public sphere.63 Because Vergara occupied a position on
the edges, residing both inside and outside of the military, it is possible that he experienced the
process of adaptation more intensely than other civilian-witnesses. Moreover, the evident respect
and affection that Vergara feels for those who, by his own account, committed merciless murders
and actively oppressed him could also be related to class. Throughout the film, Vergara evidences
a submissive and deferential attitude toward authority, characteristic of a devalued individual who
lacks the social consciousness to recognize his own oppression and who is accustomed to obeying
and depending upon others, particularly his superiors, in order to survive.
Finally, further reflection upon the kinship vocabulary used by Vergara to describe his
relationships with other members of the brigade (“fathers” and “mothers”) allows us to consider
the role of military corporatism under a dictatorial regime. The common expression “military
family” used by members of the army and their most intimate biological relations highlights an
exclusive, powerful, and loyal system of interpersonal relationships within the military and its
affiliated institutions. These tight bonds complicate possible dissidence and unfaithfulness during
times of conflict with the civilian population, given that all members of the military, especially the
army and its constituent groups, retain a connection with civilian life. As his brother notes in the
film, it is perhaps this sense of exclusivity shared by members of the military that led Vergara to cut
all ties with his family and acquaintances while working at the extermination center and the CNI.
The sequence of photographs shown after the interview with Morales highlights another
aspect of the interconnection between Vergara’s personal and professional lives. The photos show
Vergara, dressed in his uniform and armed, strolling with his wife and daughter in different
locations. Vergara assumes the roles of father and husband from within his place in the military,
and it is this sense of belonging that allows him to occupy other roles typically associated with a
respectable male adult. In his recent study, Leith Passmore observes that, even prior to Pinochet’s
regime, completing military training was, for many young men, one of the key experiences linked
with their transition into manhood, along with working, getting married, and supporting a family.64
Masculinity, a quality exalted by the army, also defines personal worth and merits respect in
other areas of Chile’s patriarchal society. In the era of the coup d’état, many young people already
possessed a stereotypical image of a soldier, based primarily upon American movies, as a strong,
unyielding, brave, and a violent man.65 We can see these characteristics manifested at multiple
junctures throughout the documentary: when Vergara trains at dawn using a nunchaku, when he
hunts a rabbit with his bare hands, showing clear experience with the task, and when he visits a
mothers. Furthermore, while she is aware of the Lautaro Brigade’s violent actions, she, nonetheless, defines her time
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street fair booth and demonstrates a strong familiarity with handling arms.66 As Connell suggests
in “Masculinities, violence, and peacemaking,” a push toward guaranteeing peace within a nation
cannot occur under an exchange of hegemonic masculine ideas extolled primarily by the army,
“which emphasize violence, confrontation and domination.”67
The scene in which Vergara hunts a rabbit (he collects the animal from a trap, wounded and
screeching; he then breaks its neck, skins it, and cleans the body) reveals a disturbing coldness and
sense of indifference in the face of suffering and death. At the same time, this particular moment
of the film calls attention to the importance of method and precision in the practice of cruelty, a
crucial detail when considering the mechanisms that allow such horrific acts to take place in torture
centers. By applying a learned method with clearly delineated steps, the perpetrator can focus on
each element of his task, rather than on the consequences, i.e. the torment that he is inflicting upon
others. This method also validates the use of torture as a historical act, one previously designed
and employed in similar situations. Because of the torturers’ methodical approach to their work,
Vergara is able to clearly describe the scene that he observed repeated on multiple occasions: the
use of electrical shock on prisoners during their torture sessions. Furthermore, this faithfulness
to method, even in his daily life, and the clear delimitation of his role at the extermination center,
likely facilitated Vergara’s relationship to the events that he witnessed as mere components of his
job, ones lacking any moral, ethical, or political implications.
In fact, Salgado Morales, who brought Vergara from Manuel Contreras’s house, where he
worked, to his new job at the extermination center, remembers him as “muy trabajador” [“very
hardworking.”]68This description coincides once again with Bauman’s observations on Milgram’s
experiment, particularly the notion of the moralization of technology, specific to authoritarian
bureaucratic systems, in which there is a division of tasks and a clear chain of command. It also
highlights how employees manage to avoid moral dilemmas, shifting judgment of their actions,
such as their significance and consequences, to how they were carried out. In other words, they
adjust themselves to the rules of the organization and the expectations of their supervisors,
who proffer moral approbation to their subordinates through either approval or other forms
of validation.69 In Vergara’s case, the description given to him by his boss at the extermination
center — “very hardworking” — as a positive moral judgment implies his total submission to the
center’s rules and the demands of his work.
In conclusion, the unusual glimpse that El mocito offers of perpetrators in situations of statesponsored violence is an important contribution to Chile’s collective memory for multiple reasons.
First, by choosing to focus on a protagonist affiliated with the state’s violent acts of repression, the
film emphasizes the significant amount of work that remains to be done on human rights abuses
in Chile. After its initial presentation of Vergara, the documentary offers the following statistics:
“A la fecha, la justicia chilena ha condenado a 260 agentes, de los cuales 51 cumplen pena efectiva”
[“Since the fall of Pinochet’s regime, the Chilean justice system has condemned 260 agents, 51 of
whom are currently serving their sentences.”]70 In an interview following the film’s release, Said
notes that these 260 agents formed part of a significantly larger group, estimated at between 3,000
and 5,000 agents, who worked for the DINA/CNI. Based on these facts, the filmmaker concludes
that Chile, “está haciendo justicia a duras penas” [“is hardly bringing about justice”], and affirms
that El mocito, as a film focused on the figure of the repressor, presents an opportunity for “la
sociedad se confronte con su pasado” [“society to confront its past.”]71
Second, El mocito allows us to reflect upon the structures, situations, and interactions that bring
common, morally adjusted individuals to support a repressive system rooted in the harassment and
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annihilation of others. This chance to reflect allows us to identify settings, both inside and outside
of repressive systems, that facilitates the enactment of cruelty, thereby opening a space in which we
can potentially resist these systems and imagine possible alternatives. Floating responsibility, the
compartmentalization of tasks, distancing actions and their consequences, weakening pluralism,
and establishing affiliations in opposition to others are some of the constituent mechanisms of these
repressive systems that have extended to other areas of civil society and subsequently become
normalized. Accordingly, the connection between the protagonist’s socioeconomic situation and
his later participation in state-mandated repression invites us to reconsider continuations of the
dictatorship into present day, as well as the role of civil-military relations in a democratic era.
Finally, the question of the Armed Forces—an organization that continues to play a central
role in the production of cruelty due in large part to its hierarchical, authoritarian, and violent
character, but also maintains autonomy, special privileges, and influence upon Chilean society
(including its role in the construction of a dominant masculine subjectivity)—underlies the entire
documentary and functions as a warning directed in particular at Chile’s political class and the
country’s civilian population as a whole. It is a warning directed at the political class because they
maintain certain authoritarian enclaves in order to avoid confronting growing social problems that
lack simple solutions: the need for justice without exceptions, the increasing protests highlighting
social inequality, the poverty plaguing a significant portion of the population, and the marginal
position of Chile’s native populations. It is a warning to the civil society as possible collaborators
and accomplices of situations leading to human rights violations in the new democratic era.
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